This paper explores the determinants of terrorist groups' location choice. In particular, I inquire into whether the number of other groups already based in a country, the political instability of a potential base country, and the distance from the potential base country to the target location influence a terrorist group's decision on where to locate its base country of operations. I apply conditional logit estimator to a data of 525 terrorist groups and 113 potential base countries of operation and find that the number of existing groups in a country increases the probability of a terrorist group choosing the country as a base of operations. More important, terrorist groups are more likely to locate in a country where existing groups share similar ideology with the entrant. A country's political instability and/or state failure raise the chances that a terrorist group will locate there, particularly for nationalist/separatist terrorist groups. Terrorist groups are more likely to base their operations closer to the venues of their planned terrorist attacks. The impact of distance, however, is nonlinear.
Introduction
An emerging literature investigated terrorism at the group level. One strand of studies examined whether and how groups' characteristics (e.g., ideology, goals, age, and size) and intergroup relations explained the level of violence, types of violence, groups' lethality, and groups' adoption of electoral strategy (e.g., Asal and Rethemeyer 2008; Piazza 2008a; Horowitz 2010; Brathwaite 2013; Horowitz and Potter 2013; Nemeth 2013) . Another strand of the extant literature explored the determinants of the duration of terrorist groups (Cronin 2006; Jones and Libicki 2008; Blomberg, Engel, and Sawyer 2010; Blomberg, Gaibulloev, and Sandler 2011; Phillips 2013) . Recently, this literature inquired into why terrorist groups ended their campaigns in certain way such as being defeated through force, joining the political process, achieving victory, and/or splintering (Carter 2012; Daxecker and Hess 2013; Gaibulloev and Sandler 2014) . This literature found that the location of groups' bases matters to the survivability of terrorist groups. Furthermore, base countries' attributes not only determined groups' longevity, but they also explained why and how terrorist groups ended their operations.
However, systematic research remains virtually nonexistent on the factors that influence a terrorist group's decision on where to base its operations. The current paper contributes to the literature by investigating into the determinants of where a terrorist group chooses to locate its base country. An understanding of why terrorist groups base their operations in particular countries has important policy relevance, since this knowledge can inform the international community where new groups may set up their home bases. If, for example, a country's political or economic instability attracts new groups, then stabilizing the potential base country should be part of a counterterrorism strategy. This paper differs substantially from earlier studies that touched upon groups' location. Piazza (2008b) uncovered that failed states are more likely to host terrorist groups that commit transnational terrorist attacks; however, this conclusion is based on correlation analysis, which does not control for other factors. More germane to the current study, Piazza's main focus was not on the base-country choice of terrorist groups. His econometric analysis looked into the relationship between failed states and transnational terrorism, using the number of transnational terrorist events as a dependent variable. Aksoy and Carter (2014) examined the interplay between terrorist group goals, electoral institutions, and the emergence of terrorist groups. These authors showed that group goals are important determinant of whether terrorist groups emerged in democracies or not. The closest study to the current paper is Bapat (2007) , which is the first article that systematically investigated this issue. He developed a game-theoretical model to explain why a terrorist group chooses a foreign, rather than target, country as a base of operation and why and when the foreign country agrees to host the group. Using a data on 73 conflicts between states and terrorist groups during 1990 -2001 , Bapat (2007 found that as a host country's capability increases, it becomes a more likely home base for the terrorist group, presumably because target countries are less likely to retaliate against a militarily strong hosting state. Also, failed states and states that have lower political affinity with the target country are more likely to attract terrorist groups. Distance between a targeted country and a host country has a negative impact on the probability of a group basing itself in a country. The current paper differs from Bapat (2007) in a number of ways. First, I employ a different empirical methodology. For example, a much larger sample allows me to examine terrorist groups' base decision across different ideologies, different time periods, and diverse regions, unlike Bapat (2007) . Second, I use a richer set of regressors that accounts for base-country attributes. My estimation method also accounts for group-specific characteristics. Third, the richer data set allows for a broader and more nuanced investigation regarding terrorist groups' choice of base country. For example, I examine how the presence of other terrorist groups in a country or the degree of the country's trade openness affects a group's location choice. These exercises produce new insights on how groups choose their base of operation (Section 4).
The primary purpose of this study is to explore the impact of the number of existing groups in a country, the political instability of the intended base country, and the distance from the intended base country to the target location on a terrorist group's decision on where to locate its base of operations. A secondary purpose is to inquire broadly on determinants of a terrorist group's choice of location. To accomplish this goal, I construct a rich dataset of 525 terrorist groups and 113 potential base countries of operation. The dataset combines information on potential base-country attributes and a supply-side variable that captures the terrorist group's cost of locating in a particular country. The conditional logit regression model, which accounts for group-specific characteristics, is applied to lay bare a terrorist group's location decision. Myriad additional analyses check the sensitivity of results, as well as offering insights by splitting the data by regions, time periods, group ideology, number of bases, etc. (Section 4). I find that the presence of other terrorist groups in a country increases the likelihood of a terrorist group choosing the country as a base of operations. By basing in the same country, terrorist groups gain from sharing knowledge, innovation, and other resources, while diluting the base government's counterterrorism resources. Furthermore, terrorist groups are more likely to base in a country where existing groups share the same ideology as the entrant, insofar as groups with a similar ideology are better equipped to overcome collective action problems. Ideology also influences groups' adoption of new tactics (Horowitz 2010) . A country's political instability and/or state failure raise the chances that a terrorist group will locate there, particularly for nationalist/separatist terrorist groups. This supports the view that unstable and failed states are favorable environments for terrorist groups to operate and for new groups to emerge. Terrorist groups are more likely to base their operations closer to the location of their terrorist attacks, which limits operation costs.
The reminder of the paper contains four sections. Section 2 defines terrorism and discusses theoretical considerations, along with the expected signs of the explanatory variables.
Section 3 explains the empirical methodology and describes the data and variables. Section 4 presents regression results and sensitivity analyses, followed by concluding thoughts in Section 5.
Preliminaries and theoretical considerations
Terrorism is "the premeditated use or threat to use violence by individuals or subnational groups to obtain a political or social objective through the intimidation of a large audience beyond that of the immediate victims" (Enders and Sandler 2012, p. 4) . The distinct features of terrorism are the application of violence and its associated political or social goals. A violent act without a political/social agenda is a criminal act. These goals may include achieving territorial changes, pursuing regime change, or promoting social revolution (Jones and Libicki 2008) . Terrorist groups level their violence in the hopes that the intimidated audience pressures the government to grant their demands. Larger terrorist groups tend to make more ambitious demands, such as regime change or social revolution, while smaller groups usually restrict themselves to issuing relatively moderate demands, such as policy change (Jones and Libicki 2008) . Some terrorist groups may join the political process once one or more of their demands are achieved. Groups with broadly defined goals (e.g., regime change, empire, or social revolution) are less apt to join the political process; presumably, the associated costs with making such concessions are too high for the targeted government (Gaibulloev and Sandler 2014 I assume that terrorist groups are rational; they try to fulfill their goals, given limited resource, and they respond to changes in their constraints in a way that maximizes their objectives. This assumed rationality is consistent with much of the literature on terrorism (e.g., Landes 1978; Sandler 1993, 2012) . A terrorist group faces a decision of choosing a base location from J alternative countries. For alternative j, the terrorist group has a utility that depends on the country j's attributes, the costs of locating in j, and the group's characteristics.
Factors that increase the group's longevity and boost its likelihood of successful attacks will increase the group's utility. Among alternative countries, the terrorist group will choose the location that maximizes its utility.
The location-specific attributes include the number of other terrorist groups already based in the country, and the degree of the country's political stability. The presence of other terrorist groups in a potential base country is desirable for new terrorist entrants for a number of reasons.
First, as the number of these groups increases, the base government must dilute its counterterrorism resources over more terrorist groups. Second, terrorist organizations may collaborate on attacks, share knowledge, pool information, utilize common training facilities, and divide other resources (Gaibulloev, Sandler, and Sul 2013; Hoffman 2006; Phillips 2013 ). Horowitz (2010) , for example, showed that terrorist groups mimic successful attacks, even though the groups' organizational structure and networks determine which tactics to adopt.
Thus, collaboration makes terrorist groups more productive and more resourceful. The costs of joint training, sharing new tactics, and acquiring knowledge are lower if cooperating groups are based in the same country. Third, terrorist groups are more likely than governments to overcome collective action problems and act together (Sandler 2005; Sandler and Gaibulloev 2012) .
Cooperation, in turn, fosters terrorist groups' longevity even in challenging conditions, such as surviving in more capable states and autocracies (Phillips 2013) . In contrast, there are factors that inhibit groups' collective action success and dissuade groups from locating near to one another. Groups' competition for resources may lead to intergroup conflicts. Siqueira (2005) showed that disagreements between political and military arms of terrorist groups may hamper collective action. This may also be true for rival groups with a common goal but different campaigns for achieving it. The sign of the net benefits of locating in the same country as other groups is an empirical question that we pursue below.
Following Takeyh and Gvosdev's (2002) , there are three rationales for groups locating in a politically unstable or failed country. First, failing and failed states lack capacity to project power internally to secure its territory and borders; this creates a favorable environment for terrorist groups to operate with impunity. Terrorist groups possess more freedom in organizing, training, and generating revenue in failed or failing states than in non-failed states. In some instances, terrorist groups create "stateless areas" within which they function autonomously without fear of government retribution. Such areas reduce the costs of staging attacks domestically and abroad. Second, political instability and the concomitant lack of economic opportunities expand the pool of potential recruits for the groups. Third, by basing in unstable and weak states, terrorist groups limit government reprisals. The base country lacks capability to annihilate the groups, while counterterrorism measures by targeted foreign countries are limited owing to the base country's sovereignty. In addition, conflicts may lead to the emergence of new groups. As a conflict becomes bloodier, the chances of parties resorting to terrorist attacks increase as currently evidenced in Syria.
1 Available empirical evidence suggests that failed states are more likely to host terrorist groups that commit transnational attacks (Piazza 2008b ).
Thus, I anticipate a positive impact of conflicts on location choice.
There are other base-country attributes that impact terrorist groups' location decision.
Groups may choose a high-income country for skilled recruits (Li and Schaub 2004) .
Consequently, the impact of trade openness on the choice of base is expected to be positive. The literature on groups' survivability theorized that a base country's democracy, fractionalization, elevation, tropical area, landlocked area and regional location influence a based group's longevity and success (e.g., Blomberg, Engel, and Sawyer 2010; Blomberg, Gaibulloev, and Sandler 2011; . Therefore, these country characteristics are expected to impact a terrorist group's location choice.
Costs associated with planning and supplying attacks from a base location to a target location are important considerations for groups' location decision. If a group decides to base in a country other than its target state, then it should account for the costs associated with the movement of terrorists and resources across border(s). The longer is the distance between a group's location and its venue country, the higher is its expected costs. Trade openness may lower the costs of operating from a distance. As such, the negative impact of distance on a terrorist group's location choice is smaller for a more open country. In addition, as countries become more open over time, the impact of distance is expected to diminish.
A terrorist group's characteristic, such as its goal(s), tactics, and ideology can also influence the group's location choice. Aksoy and Carter (2013) showed that a terrorist groups'
goal is an important determinant of where -in democracies or non-democracies -terrorist groups emerge. Groups with nationalistic/separatist ideologies may gain from locating inside or in close proximity of the venue country. Groups such as Al Qaeda, however, are not confined ideologically to a particular country or territory (Takeyh and Gvosdev's 2002).
Empirical methodology and data

Empirical methodology
Consider a terrorist group i that chooses which country to base its operations. After basing in term to obtain the group's random utility: 
. Then, following McFadden (1974) , the probability of choosing location
Equation (2) is the conditional logit model. The terrorist group's characteristics,  j -which do not vary across countries -do not appear in equation (2) (2) is estimated by maximizing the log-likelihood function,
where N is the number of terrorist groups.
Data
The sample consists of 525 terrorist groups and 113 potential base countries of operations.
Socio-economic, political, and geographical independent variables, associated with potential base locations, are included along with a supply-side variable that captures the terrorist group's costs of locating in a particular country. Because the conditional logit model accounts for unobservable group-specific characteristics (see Method section), group-specific variables are not included. The dependent variable is 1 if a terrorist group chooses a particular country as a base location, and is 0 otherwise. Data on when a terrorist group started and its base country or countries of operations comes from Jones and Libicki (2008) . More than 78% of sample terrorist groups possessed a single base country of operations, while less than 3% of these groups had more than three base countries.
Next, a host of variables are constructed that are associated with the groups' base country attributes. For each group, the time-varying location variables correspond to the year when a group made an entry decision. To assess whether terrorist groups' decision to locate in a particular country are affected by the presence of other terrorist groups in that country, I
introduce a variable Other Groups. This variable denotes the number of other terrorist groups already located in a particular country when terrorist groups decide their base location. Data from Penn World Table Version captures the annual intensity of a relevant event; this index ranges between 0 for events with less than 300 fatalities and 5 for events with more than 256,000 fatalities. All indices are converted so that they start from 1 rather than 0, since 0 in the data implies that there is no conflict.
Conflict is an indicator variable that is 1 if any of the four types of events occurred at a given time in a country. The dichotomous variable is used owing to the difficulty of aggregating indices associated with distinct types of events. As a robustness check, we also introduce Conflict1, which is a combined score of the four types of events and Conflict2, which is the maximum of the revolutionary and the ethnic war scores. There are some instances of multiple ethnic war events in a given year, which are handled by averaging the magnitude scores.
The Polity variable accounts for the degree of democracy and ranges between -10 and +10 (Marshall and Jaggers 2009) Gallup et al. (1999a) and Gallup et al. (1999b) . The latter variable is 1 if a country lacks direct access to international waters, and 0 otherwise. Using information on population (Heston et al. 2011 ) and land area (Gallup et al. 1999a; Gallup et al. 1999b) , I compute population density in thousands of people per square Finally, the distance between a terrorist group's target countries and its potential base country of operations (Distance) are calculated to capture the costs associated with planning and supplying terrorist attacks from a base country. This distance variable is constructed as follow.
First, I identify countries that were venue of a group's terrorist attacks to serve as a proxy for the group's target country. Second, I compute the share of the group's transnational attacks in each venue country, either over the group's lifespan or through 2009 if the group was still active.
Information on transnational terrorist attacks by groups comes from RAND Database of
Worldwide Terrorism Incidents (RAND 2012). In some instances, the same terrorist group has different variants of its names reported in RAND (2012) and in Jones and Libicki (2008 is the set of all group i's target countries, i.e. countries that were venues for terrorist attacks by group i. We also include the squared term of distance (Distance sqrd.) to check for a possible non-linear effect of distance. The number of groups reduces to 352 with distance data owing to missing observations and an absence of recorded terrorist attacks by some groups in RAND database. The advantage of using this subsample is that I narrow the focus on the behavior of those terrorist groups that perpetrated at least some transnational terrorist attacks.
From 352 groups, 81 groups staged all or part of their terrorist attacks outside their base country of operations and 207 groups carried out terrorist attacks solely in their base countries.
Another 64 groups with multiple bases of operations perpetrated part of their attacks in one of their base locations. I do not have information on the extent to which each base was involved in planning and executing such attacks; it is likely that the base in venue country might had a more prominent role in committing those attacks, but this is purely speculative.
Summary statistics of variables along with data sources are gathered in Table 1 . The number of observations is less than 59325 for some variables owing to missing observations.
The mean number of other groups is 1.5. The means of the conflict dummy variable (Conflict) and Distance variable are 0.21 and about 70.4 (in 100 kilometers), respectively. These averages are taken over all sample observations.
[ Table 1 near here]
Out of the 59325 observations in our sample, 699 observations correspond to actual base country choices made by terrorist groups (i.e., the dependent variable is 1). Now I describe the variables statistics for these 699 actual choices. The average number of other existing terrorist groups in a base country is about 6. If these 699 observations are divided into two subsamplesbefore 1990 and after the start of 1990, then the average number of groups is about 4 in the before-1990 subsample and about 8 in the after-1990 subsample. Similarly, the average distance is about 12 or 1200 kilometers. The mean distances are about 1400 kilometers and 900 kilometers for before 1990 and after the start of 1990, respectively. These are striking statistics.
If groups' concentration were due to agglomeration economies, then one would expect that the benefits associated with locating near each other should fall, as transportation and communication costs have decreased in recent decades. Similarly, it would seem that the distance should become less important due to easier movement of people, goods, and knowledge across space. Yet terrorist groups are more concentrated and are based closer to target countries after 1990. Since 9/11 and increases in border defenses and homeland security in rich countries, movement of terrorists is likely impeded and may partly explain this clustering. The mean of Conflict is 0.35, suggesting that 35% of base countries experienced some types of instability at the moment of terrorist groups' entry. Figure 1 shows the percentage of base countries with at least one (other) terrorist group and the percentage of base countries that experienced some type of conflict at the moment of a group's entry.
[ Figure 1 near here]
The vast majority of groups, about 86%, chose a country that already had terrorist groups based on its soil. This percentage did not change over time. Before 1990, about 30% of base countries experienced a conflict at the moment of a group's entry. This number jumped to 40%
after the start of 1990. The Polity data is available for 648 (out of 699) location choices made by the sample groups and 399 of those choices correspond to countries with Polity score of 5 or higher at the time of a group's entry. This agrees with Eubank and Weinberg's (1994) finding that terrorist groups are more likely to be present in democratic countries.
Various factors can explain the above observations. For example, a group may choose a base country not just because of the presence of other terrorist groups, but also due to attractive socio-economic and political conditions that attracted other groups. Even though transportation costs declined in the later period, this era coincided with a significant increase in counterterrorism efforts by the US and its allies and much less state sponsorship (Enders and Sandler 1999; . These considerations inhibited groups from moving resources or communicating across countries. In the next section, I perform econometric analysis by controlling for these and other factors.
The list of location countries and their corresponding geographical regions are given in Table 2 presents the main results, for which Model 1 is the baseline regression. Model 2 adds the number of other terrorist groups, elevation, landlocked, and tropics variables to the baseline regression, while Model 3 also includes the distance variable. Finally, Model 4 adds the squared distance term and an interaction between distance and trade openness. Models 3 and 4 are restricted to the subsample of terrorist groups that perpetrated at least one transnational terrorist attack.
Empirical results
[ Table 2 near here]
Primary variables of interest are highlighted. Ceteris paribus, a terrorist group is more likely to base its operations in a country that has a greater number of existing terrorist groups,
Other Groups. The finding is statistically significant across all models that control various factors. For terrorist groups, this suggests that the benefits associated with other terrorist groups in a base country outweigh the resulting costs. The impact of conflict on the probability of a group's location choice is positive; but, it is only statistically significant in Model 1. There, thus, is no statistically robust evidence that terrorist groups prefer to base their operations in a politically unstable country. Two alternative measures of conflicts -the combined score of the four distinct types of conflicts and the maximum score of revolutionary war and ethnic war -are used as a robustness check, but they are not statistically significant in Models 2-4. There is, however, a positive link between conflict and the number of terrorist groups, since the average number of these groups is about three times higher (4.42 compared to 1.54) in places and times of conflict. When Models 2-4 are re-estimated by excluding the Other Groups variable, the conflict variable is statistically significant in all Models. The other two alternative measures of conflict also become statistically significant in the absence of Other Groups (results are available upon request). This finding, however, must be taken with caution due to endogeneity concerns that follow from excluding Other Groups.
The distance variable has a negative impact on the likelihood of a group's location choice variable is added. The signs of the estimated coefficients for population density, polity, and regional dummy variables, except Europe and Central Asia, change across models. For example, the Polity coefficient is positive and statistically significant in Model 1, but is negative and statistically significant in Models 3-4. These differences might arise from different sample sizes.
Furthermore, the sample in Models 3-4 is restricted to those groups that performed some transnational attacks. Therefore, I re-estimate Model 1 using the sample size of Models 3-4 and found generally the same result, so that differences in the estimated coefficients and their signs are not driven by alternative sample sizes.
Next, I divide the sample into two subsamples: terrorist groups that made their location choice before 1990 and after the start of 1990. Out of 525 groups, the before-1990 subsample consists of 234 groups, while the after 1990 subsample consists of 291 groups. This division allows me to contrast the era of greater state sponsorship of terrorism to that of less state sponsorship (Hoffman 2006; Enders and Sandler 2012) . To some extent, this also permits an intertemporal investigation of the main variables, such as distance. The second period subsample also captures, in part, the increased counterterrorism efforts by international community 2 . Table 3 presents the results.
[ Table 3 near here] Models 1-3 are specified similarly to Models 1-2 and 4 in Table 2 , respectively. The main results do not differ in terms of sign and statistical significance across the two periods. The number of other terrorist groups is a positive determinant, while distance is a negative determinant of a group's location choice. The estimate of the squared term of distance is positive, suggesting that the negative impact of distance diminishes so that at some point the effect of distance becomes positive. Conflict, however, is not statistically significant when included with Other Groups variable (Models 2-3). These results confirm the main findings in 2 The earlier period is also the era of leftist terrorists and nationalist/separatist terrorists, while the later period is the era of fundamentalist terrorists (Hoffman 2006; Repoport 2004) . Different tactics by leftist and fundamentalist groups might impact their prospects of basing in a country. The conditional logit regression accounts for groupspecific characteristics, such as tactics and ideology. Nevertheless, the division would capture these differences. . Given a small sample size concern, I combine some regions. Table 4 presents the estimates of the primary variables as well as those controls that are statistically significant across various models for a region. To save space, I only show two models for each region. Models 1-2 are similar to Models 2 and 4 in Table 2 , except for the exclusion of regional dummy variables. Key findings generally hold across different regions.
The estimated coefficient for the number of other groups is positive (in seven of the displayed models), the effect of distance is negative, and the impact of the squared term of distance is positive. These coefficients are statistically significant across all models and regions, except for
Other Groups in Model 2 for EAP & SA. The conflict variable is not robust, as it had been in Table 2 . The sole exception is LAC & NA, where the impact of conflict is negative on location choice, which is surprising. I revisit this result when discussing group ideology. Religious fractionalization has a negative effect on location choice in ECA, while population size has a positive impact on location choice in MENA & SS. Afr. The estimated coefficient for an interaction between distance and trade openness is negative and marginally significant for LAC & NA.
[ Table 4 near here]
For the entire sample period, I then partition my sample into three subsamples based on terrorist groups' ideology: left wing (192 groups), nationalist/separatist (189 groups), and religious and right wing (144 groups) ( Table 5 ). Models 1-3 are specified similarly to Models 1-2 and 4 in Table 2 . Again, the results across ideological subsamples consistently support the main findings in Table 2 . A number of other results, however, differ across subsamples. An important new finding is that nationalist/separatist groups are, ceteris paribus, more likely to locate in a country that experiences conflict. This finding distinguishes from the non-robust effect of conflict in Table 2 . In our sample, 245 location choices correspond to base countries that were experiencing instability. Nationalist/separatist groups made 105, or 43%, of these location choices. Thus, there is a positive correlation between nationalist/separatist groups' location choice and conflict. The impact of conflict is not significant in the subsamples of leftwing, religious, and right-wing groups.
[ Table 5 ]
Left-wing terrorist groups are more likely to choose a country in Latin America and Caribbean or North America as a base country. In contrast, the impacts of these regional variables are not robust for nationalist/separatist terrorist groups, though the sign of the coefficients are generally negative. Latin America and Caribbean is statistically significant in Table 4 ). Religious and right-wing terrorist groups are less likely to locate in Europe and Central Asia. The estimated coefficient for Europe and Central Asia variable is significant for the left-wing subsample but its sign changes across models. The same holds true for the effect of sub-Saharan Africa variable for the nationalist/separatist subsample. The impacts of other regional dummy variables are not robust.
More populated countries and countries with higher elevation level are more likely base locations for religious and right-wing terrorist groups, while countries with larger tropical areas are less likely choices for these groups. The country' elevation is also positive and significant for the leftist group subsample. The impacts of population and tropical area, however, are not significant for left-wing and nationalist/separatist subsamples. Greater religious diversity reduces the likelihood of a country being chosen by left-wing groups. This variable is not significant for the other two subsamples.
So far, I did not distinguish between the entering group's ideology and the ideology of the other terrorist groups already based in a country. In Table 6 , I re-estimate Model 3 of Table   2 but distinguish the number of other groups by ideology. For example, Other Groups LW, denotes the number of other based groups that are leftist. Although I do not show the results for other model specifications, these results are similar to the findings in Table 6 (available upon request). Left-wing terrorist groups are more likely to choose a country with a greater number of already-based leftist groups, which also holds for nationalist/separatist, religious, and right-wing groups. Thus, a terrorist group is more likely to base in a country where resident groups have a similar ideology to the entering group.
Conclusion
This paper contributes to the literature by extending earlier work on terrorist groups to elucidate why these groups choose a particular country as their base of operations. The paper's primary focus is to investigate whether a country's political instability and/or state failure, its existing terrorist groups, and its distance to terrorist attacks' venues impact a terrorist group's likelihood of locating in the country. We answer these questions by applying the conditional logit regression to a data of 525 terrorist groups and 113 alternative location-choice countries. Myriad other variables are included to control for various factors that might influence this base decision.
Moreover, a multitude of sensitivity checks are performed to ascertain the robustness of the primary findings to alternative model specifications. Significance levels: *** is <.01, ** is <.05, and * is <.10. Standard errors are in parentheses. Only the variables of interest are shown to save space. See Models 1-2 and 4 in Table 2 for the full specification of each model. Table 2 for the full specification of each model. Countries in conflict (%) Other groups (%)
